


MARCH 1954

ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST



In This Issue:

A STOCKHOLDER'S REPORT in which every citizen has a vital stake, *The Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense*, covers the period 1 January to 30 June 1953, but in long-range significance it encompasses much more. During those six months a fundamental re-evaluation of the Nation's defense plans took shape—plans which are designed to insure maximum effectiveness at minimum cost. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson's *Report* is summarized in "Efficiency and Economy for National Defense."

TRADITION IN THE MAKING. At once serene and magnificent, the front cover view of Battle Monument overlooking the Hudson at West Point is one to stir America's pride. Two years ago this month, the United States Military Academy observed the sesquicentennial of its founding, and this year the Museum there marks its first hundred years. In that relatively brief period, the Museum has assembled an unexcelled collection of relics associated with the Nation's past military glories and growth to a position of world pre-eminence. "Hall of History on the Hudson" takes the reader on a tour of this ever-growing repository of military tradition.

ALTHOUGH WEST POINT was originally founded as a school for engineers, none of its early bridge builders ever envisioned a creation such as that which appears on the back cover. Developed by the Army Engineer Research and Development Laboratories at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, this experimental scissors-type bridge—made of aluminum and capable of supporting a 60-ton load—is carried and launched by a modified turret-less tank.

An index to ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST for 1953 is now available for free distribution. Requests indicating the number of copies desired should be addressed to: The Editor, ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST, Fort Slocum, New York.

PILLARS OF STRATEGY. "Despite established doctrines and principles to assure military victory, war is frankly a gamble, fraught with possibilities of errors, miscalculations and ultimate defeat," the Commander in Chief of United Nations Command points out in "The Fundamentals of War." General John E. Hull analyzes the eight fundamentals which must be considered in any sound strategic decision.

LESSONS IN LEADERSHIP and a portentous prophecy from the past are evoked in "Centennial of Japan's Awakening." Commodore Matthew C. Perry's experience in opening Japan to Western trade demonstrates that firmness in leadership and command, expertly applied, goes hand in hand with success in diplomatic negotiations.

ROCKET RESEARCH. High on a granite ridge in the Mojave Desert a new breed of pioneers is pushing forward the frontiers of science. Work carried on at the "Rocket Engine Test Station" is helping to usher in the era of rocket propulsion for aircraft and missiles.

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U. S. Army Photograph

GENERAL JOHN E. HULL

The Fundamentals of War

General John E. Hull

THE HISTORIAN and the military strategist alike, each in his own way, have found that there are certain principles governing military undertakings which have produced success in war—"success" in this context meaning victory over our enemies.

Admittedly, war is not an exact science. Its principles cannot be considered to be laws in any mathematical sense. They do not constitute a specific theory or a method and they cannot be applied with equal value at all times. Indeed, in many cases one principle must be applied at the expense of another.

Classical authorities have long realized that despite established doctrines and principles designed to assure military victory, war is frankly a gamble. War will continue to remain fraught with possibilities of errors, miscalculations and ultimate defeat. Its elements are simple, yet their interplay is complex.

As General Eisenhower observed, "The basic fundamentals of strategy are so simple that a child may understand them. But to determine their proper application to a given situation requires the hardest . . . work from the finest available staff officers."

Unquestionably, there are many fundamentals of warfare, depending upon what strategic or tactical level is involved. Certain principles, however, are basic to any strategic decision.

Formulate and adhere to a sound strategic concept. Strategy must have continuity and coherence suited to the full range of one's war aims. Having once evolved a suitable strategy, persevere in it. Be systematic and unfaltering in carrying it out.

In World War II the Allies finally agreed on a strategy to defend against the Japanese in the Pacific and, at the same time, conduct an offensive against the Germans in Europe. I believe that this strategic concept was sound, for it was only in Europe that we could rapidly and economically concentrate

GENERAL JOHN E. HULL is Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and Commander in Chief, Far East Command. This article is based on addresses delivered at the Army War College and Army Finance School while General Hull was Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army.

the combined force of the Allies. Also, there was the urgent problem of preventing one ally, the Soviet Union, from being defeated and put out of the war.

It was not easy to adopt and adhere to this concept. The Japanese had swept away the whole order of things in the Pacific. Many segments of our military and political opinion felt that we were opening ourselves to disaster by not concentrating immediately upon breaking the military power of the Japanese. Even after we had reconciled ourselves to the policy of Europe first, there was still the question of whether the Channel or the Balkans should be selected as the route for re-entry into Europe.

Again, I believe that we were right in not deviating from our determination to re-enter Northwestern Europe via the Channel. General Eisenhower described the wisdom of that decision in these words: "History has proved that nothing is more difficult in war than to adhere to a single strategic plan . . . But the war in Europe was finally won because through every difficulty, delay, pressure and profitable preliminary temptation to forsake the original concept—the President, General Marshall, and many others never wavered from the purpose of launching a full-out invasion of Europe across the English Channel at the earliest practical moment."

Far from advocating rigidity in strategic matters, I recognize that improvisation and adaptation are necessary at times. But we cannot expect success if we do not chart a calculated course.

Understand the objective. This derives from the first principle of war that "the ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and his will to fight." This principle is certainly explicit enough. Yet it has not always been understood in the past, and even now we seem to be in a period in which the objective is being obscured.

The problem facing our Nation today arises not from our ignorance but rather from our lack of understanding of the objective; this in turn has been aggravated by advances in our technology and the complex economic and political structure of our society. Because we possess machines that fraction the factor of space, and weapons that unleash unparalleled power in this atomic age, we tend to question the old rules. Today we are uncertain whether the enemy's armed forces remain the principal factor of his will to resist. We wonder whether by a massive stroke against the political capital and the war-

industry complex of a nation we cannot achieve in a brief space of time the objective that formerly resulted only from the defeat and neutralization of the enemy's military forces.

This conflict of sincere doubt must be resolved because our over-all strategy and the preparations that must be made to implement it will depend entirely on the concept that prevails.

Anticipate the demands of the future. This fundamental concept is thoroughly established in the military doctrine of the United States Army. Even so, many are unaware how much the success of strategy depends on the capability of projecting one's self beyond the immediate military problem.

Current requirements may tax our available resources, leaving little time for long-range planning. However, we must never permit today's demands to stultify our imagination or to use up our energies to such a degree that we have little inclination to consider tomorrow's opportunities.

Authority underlies command. The principles of war can be applied only by a commander who has sufficient authority to control all aspects of the operations for which he is responsible. The doctrine of the United States Army is that authority shall be conferred in direct proportion to responsibility. This is in accord with the teachings of most military writers, and while military men are not directly concerned with factors governing between the military and political, they cannot disregard political factors entirely, especially in dealing with allies.

Perfect the organization for war. This is one concept which has not received enough attention as a factor in determining success. Poor organization can create a fatal friction in the conduct of operations. Good organization can free a commander to make full use of the power and resources at his disposal.

In World War II, considering the time available, we developed a satisfactory organization of the Army and of the whole military structure. In any future war, however, we shall have to contend with highly complex national and international staff and command organizations in the execution of strategy. The composition of the United Nations Command in the Far East is probably a fair example of this type of structure.

Constant effort must be made to keep our objectives from being obscured by the vast complexities of joint and combined operations carried out world wide.

Keep continually informed. In few endeavors does the pos-

session of relevant facts give the absolute advantage that obtains in warfare. The struggle to deny information of ourselves to the enemy and to acquire knowledge of him is a dominant and unchanging feature of war.

Needless to say, there are two sides to this intelligence coin. In all military matters, but especially in the formulation and execution of strategy, we must be informed not only of the enemy. We must also be informed about ourselves.

Obviously, we cannot translate our concepts into actual plans and directives until we have access to a multitude of facts. In World War II there were great gaps in the body of recorded information available to the military. As a result, one of the most frustrating and agonizing features of our planning was the unremitting search for key facts and information. But we have learned our lesson. At least we are stressing the importance of information throughout the Government—a task which demands patience, perseverance and professional competency.

Consideration of the human element. This principle gives meaning to all the rest. It is a reminder that man himself in the end determines the course of war. Taking into account the human element, we must be guided by the many aspects of human behavior as it operates in war and peace. As a democratic country, our Nation always has valued human factors but we have not always fully exploited them in war.

Comprehend the means. Someone has likened strategy to diplomacy as "the art of the possible." It is vital in warfare to know what we can do, both now and in the future. Naturally, what we can do is directly dependent upon our means. But the means available are the sum of such diverse and complex factors as our geography, the quantity and quality of our manpower, the state of our technology, the broadness of our industrial base, the quality of the statecraft of our political and military leaders, our access to resources, the strength of our economy, and the willingness and ability of our citizens to sacrifice for the common defense.

A perfect understanding of all these elements is not humanly possible. Yet our success will be in direct proportion to the degree to which our solution approaches the perfect answer. It will depend on how wisely we can apportion the means to accomplish the objective.

The vital relationship between military operations and mate-

rial, economic, political and social means has been emphasized recently by President Eisenhower. In public addresses and messages to the Congress, the President has pointed out that a true posture of defense is composed of three factors—spiritual, military and economic. He has declared: "I have always firmly believed that there is a great logic in the conduct of military affairs. There is an equally great logic in economic affairs. If these two logical disciplines can be wedded, it is then possible to create a situation of maximum military strength within economic capacities.

"If, on the other hand, these two are allowed to proceed in disregard one for the other, you then create a situation either of doubtful military strength, or of such precarious economic strength that your military position is in constant jeopardy."


This is the broad concept, the doctrine and the criteria that must govern our thinking and direct our actions.

Within the framework of the military requirement, resources determine military strategy. Translation of raw materials into the finished tools of war thus becomes a critical problem. If we fail to accomplish this, we are likely to fail in all other respects.

In substance, this fundamental embraces the logistics of war. In many respects this is the most critical factor influencing the success of any military operation. For logistics is more than a matter of obtaining efficient use of all available resources and material. It requires a knowledge and appreciation of the complex industrial and economic structure of our Nation.

It is no longer enough that the military commander know his own profession. He also must be able to understand the problems and principles of industry and to anticipate and measure the impact of a mobilization effort on our national economy. He must be sensitive to the desires, plans and expectations of his fellow citizens as they affect the Army and the Armed Forces.

In other words, his vision must not be limited to the military horizon. Economic strength, political solidarity, social well-being and military preparedness are interdependent. This relationship is not static. It is not a subject that can be studied once and learned forever. It is a state of being that is as vital and changing as life itself.



Cross-section diagram shows principal features of the rocket engine test stand.

Rocket Engine Test Station

Brigadier General J. Stanley Holtoner

THE WHOOSHING ROAR of a jet engine whines over the desert air, rising and falling as power changes are made. Yet no aircraft or missile is in the sky. The engine is not even considered ready to fly. It is being thoroughly tested under varying conditions encountered in actual flight yet it never leaves the ground. The scene is the Experimental Rocket Engine Test Station (ERETS) far out in the Mojave Desert, at the Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base, California.

Not so long ago it was possible to design, build and test in free flight the relatively simple and inexpensive rockets used in aircraft or missiles. The Germans, for instance, are known to have fired some 5 percent more V-2 rockets in tests than they fired at the British Isles. Once launched, a missile, unlike a test aircraft, is usually a total loss. If a valve or an electrical control fails and the missile does not operate properly, nothing can be done but to evaluate the wreckage and try again. But obviously today's rockets, developing many thousand pounds of thrust and costing thousands of dollars, would be extremely expensive to test in free flight. Hence the need for a facility capable of static testing of missile propulsion systems and individual components.

Early in 1951 such a facility became a reality with activation of the Experimental Rocket Engine Test Station. The activity is operated by the Rocket Branch of the Engineering Laboratory under control of the Air Force Flight Test Center, one of nine research, development and testing units of the Air Research and Development Command with headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland. (See "Military Aviation—Research for the Future," September 1953 DIGEST.) Primary mission of the Center is the flight testing of aircraft and component parts; and the liquid rocket engine tests at ERETS often parallel flight tests of prototype missiles and aircraft.

BRIGADIER GENERAL J. STANLEY HOLTONER, USAF, is Commander, Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base, California.

The Test Station has value even above the work it performs for the Air Force. It is one of the first facilities to be owned and staffed by the Government for use by contracting agencies. Here the various civilian contractors who design and build propulsion systems and components are able to utilize Air Force equipment and personnel as well as their own. This arrangement makes for superior economy and efficiency since it is much cheaper to build one completely equipped plant than to build (directly or indirectly at Government expense) separate though less complete facilities for each. In addition there is an added bonus—for the Test Station provides training in the unique skills required in rocket development projects.


The installation is scattered over a series of granite ridges overlooking the Mojave Desert floor. Its most prominent structures are the huge cement and steel static thrust stands. Perched precariously on the edge of a sheer cliff, these are built to withstand the strain of many thousands of pounds of thrust acting vertically. Missiles or engines fit into the steel mounting cradles. A water deluge system floods the base of the stands—which extend as much as sixty feet into the bedrock—to prevent damage to the cement from the extremely hot blasts of the large engines. A similar emergency system is built into the test stand itself to drench them in case of fire.

Equipment installed in the stands simulates conditions encountered in free flight. Mounting cradles can be tilted to give the effect of operating at varying angles. Now being planned is equipment to simulate reduced pressure and extremely high or low temperatures for engine component testing.

Provisions can be made for mounting more than one engine on each stand at once, although only one would be tested at a time. This arrangement would reduce the changeover time between trials. Steel shields protect engines from the effects of nearby runs. The stands also contain integral supplies of fuels and oxidizers necessary for extended runs.

The toxic nature of some missile propellants and the danger of violent explosions, make storage and handling of hundreds of gallons of rocket fuels a problem of prime importance. The gleaming, oddly shaped fuel storage tanks and the two huge test stands provide a bizarre contrast to the miles of uninterrupted desert surrounding the Station.

During a test, engineers control firing and runs of the engines



Perched on a rocky hillside, these static thrust test stands are moored in solid granite.

U. S. Air Force Photograph



An engineer in the Central Control Room stands ready to operate the firing switch. In the background a periscope is used to observe the flame pattern, while a technician checks recorder devices.

U. S. Air Force Photograph

from a Central Control Station located midway between the two main test stands. Here technicians may view the tests either visually or through scores of delicate instruments that record every possible action of the engine. Elaborate safety features prevent injury from explosions or toxic gas.

A major test usually requires hundreds of records. The permanently installed recorders, oscillographs and control panels are available for the use of any organization which may be conducting the test. Any special instrumentation which may be required is furnished by the contractor.

Although Edwards Air Force Base is only 31 road miles away and Los Angeles is 140 miles south, the Test Station itself is practically self sustaining. There are offices, maintenance and general machine shops, transportation facilities, photographic services and an automatic telephone exchange. Housing and dining facilities are provided for transient personnel.

Because of the nature of the work performed, close co-operation is required between civilian and military personnel. This is achieved by a smooth working Administration and Plans Office. Many of the permanently employed personnel—and many of those employed by commercial concerns as well—are former Air Force officers who remained in their positions when they reverted to civilian status.


Despite the fact that salaries are not on a par with those of industry and despite the isolated location of the Station, there is a remarkably low turnover of skilled workers. A major factor is in the unique nature of the work. Civil, chemical, electrical and aeronautical engineers and others find that the challenge offered by experimental rocket engine development and testing far outweighs other considerations.

These men and the Air Force officers and enlisted personnel assigned to this fascinating work, so important to the national defense, are helping to bring the forthcoming "Rocket Era" more rapidly into reality.

Hall of History

On the Hudson

Bruce Jacobs



OUTSIDE, several hundred young Americans are learning to become leaders of a modern army in an atomic age. Inside the pages of the Nation's past military glories unfold, from the pre-Revolutionary era to Korea.

To the visitor it seems particularly appropriate that the Hudson Valley, so rich in the lore and legend of Colonial times, should be the site of this outstanding collection of martial and historical memorabilia assembled in the Museum of the United States Military Academy at West Point.

The small sign reading "MUSEUM" outside a wing of the Administration Building of the Academy might easily be missed. But in 1953 no less than one hundred and twenty thousand visitors from all sectors of the United States and many foreign countries noted that sign and walked up the stairs to view the exhibits housed on three floors. The Museum is one of the attractions that helps make West Point a national shrine.

BRUCE JACOBS, magazine writer and editor, is a former Army combat correspondent and author of the book *Korea's Heroes: The Medal of Honor Story*.

Far from being merely a repository for items of military antiquity, the Museum has a vital, influential role in the academic, cultural and military instruction that is provided for the Corps of Cadets. Instructors utilize selected exhibits as training aids in classroom lectures. Cadets take out individual weapons for closer study or they consult the large map collection for better understanding of old campaigns. The Museum is constantly growing as new acquisitions are added to the six thousand items already cataloged—and plans for more extensive coverage of the Nation's military development are continually in process.

In the story of those six thousand items the visitor—whether in search of military background, engaging in professional research or just browsing—may trace the history not only of past wars but of the entire growth of the Nation. There are bright flags ranging from the very first battle colors captured by American troops in the Revolutionary War to Japanese and North Korean banners.




An old Battalion Color of the Corps of Cadets is typical of the splendid collection of historic Army standards.

U. S. Army Photograph

In the Small Arms Room, row upon row, are ancient muskets, rifles, pistols and other weapons through which the evolution

of modern automatic weapons may be traced. The West Point Room graphically portrays life at the Academy from the time when it was the only engineering school in the country down to the present. On display there are busts and pictures of famous graduates, personal items such as old uniforms, class rings, commissions, decorations and surveying instruments. In another room is a glittering collection of swords; and nearby are entire cases of decorations, coins, Indian relics.

Besides the thousands of items neatly displayed, many more are stored over the Old Cavalry Stables for want of much-needed floor space. On the grounds of the Academy are cannon dating from earliest days of settlement of the North American continent to modern types. Included are some pieces which have become famous in the annals of warfare—"Whistlin' Dick" from the defenses of Vicksburg (so-called because of the whistling noise made by its projectiles as they tore through the air) and the remains of the huge Confederate rifle which fired a 900-pound shot and ranked among the largest ever cast. Links of the huge chain that blocked the Hudson River during the Revolution also may be seen on the grounds of the Academy.



Whistlin' Dick, a cannon used by the Confederates at Vicksburg, was so named because of the sound made by its projectiles. National Archives Photograph

All statues, portraits, paintings and historical trophies at the Academy come under the administrative supervision of the Museum. Many of the drawings were made by Cadets. Since

sketching ability in the field has always been a desirable military skill, it has been taught at West Point for well over a century. One Cadet who did not survive the rigid courses at West Point later attained fame as an artist—James McNeill Whistler. Some of his sketches are owned by the Museum. Today the staff is planning to bring art exhibits to West Point in order to further the cultural side of the Academy's educational system.



General Pershing—a painting by Wojciech Kossak.

U. S. Army Photograph

The West Point Museum this year is celebrating its centenary, having been officially established as the Ordnance and Artillery Museum in 1854. But even before that, graduates and other Army officers had long used West Point as a repository for war trophies. Some of the relics were displayed by various academic departments or in the library. However, most of the cannon, flag staffs, swords, muskets, pistols and other mementoes gathered dust along with the Great Chain.

Today the visitor finds that graduates and other friends have continued to maintain a healthy interest in the Museum and have kept a steady stream of historic contributions flowing in. Although difficult to appraise in monetary terms, their value has been estimated at a million and a half dollars—a figure which

is all the more impressive since most of the displays are donated. No appropriated funds are available except to pay staff salaries and to provide for routine operating expenses and repairs. But a special gift fund has furnished the Museum with a small source of income which allows it to make some purchases. Altogether, in recent years, the Museum has been able to spend close to \$25,000 for acquisitions relating to military history which could not have been obtained otherwise.

The professional staff itself is small but adequate—a director and three curators. All are acknowledged museum experts with Civil Service status. However small the staff, they are eager to answer questions or to elaborate on the printed cards that give a brief description of items on display. A tour with one of the curators produces many fascinating facts.



A portrait of General Winfield Scott by an unknown artist is typical of the art collection to be seen throughout the Academy. U. S. Army Photograph

It really was General Winfield Scott, whose career spanned the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the early part of the Civil War, who was largely responsible for establishing the Museum. An avid souvenir hunter, General Scott donated his large collection of trophies to West Point. There were arms, banners and cannon from the Mexican War—a collection so large that it became necessary to create a suitable repository for these and the other items that had been accumulating.

Currently on display are colors carried in the War of 1812, Civil War battle flags including Union colors re-taken from the Confederates, and numerous other regimental flags. Over in one corner is a nine-foot section of the flag pole from Fort Sumter, South Carolina, where the United States flag was first fired on in 1861. There too is the Spanish flag staff taken from the Governor's Palace at Santiago de Cuba, 17 July 1898, during the Spanish-American War.

A memento of the Boxer Rebellion in China is the Regimental Flag which the 14th Infantry Regiment (reactivated in Korea in 1951) carried when that unit was protecting American nationals from the onslaughts of the Society of Harmonious Fists in 1900-01.


Not all of the flags mark battles or date from time of war. One, for instance, brings up memories of peacetime achievements of the United States Army. It is the flag that, on 15 August 1914, fluttered aboard the S.S. *Ancon*, first ship to traverse the Panama Canal which had just been completed under supervision of the Army Engineers.

A rarity is a United States flag which displays forty-nine stars in the field. This, the staff explain, is no error nor does it hold any reference to proposals of statehood for Hawaii or Alaska. Actually it was hand sewn by residents of the tiny Czech town of Rodycany when United States troops liberated it from the Nazis. The extra star, a town spokesman gravely explained, was to represent the town and how it felt about the Americans.

Another flag with a dramatic story is a Japanese battle banner. It was captured during a fire fight on Leyte in the Philippines as Eighth Army troops were repelling a Japanese paratroop drop on American airfield positions. Two soldiers who were hand-carrying ammunition under fire noticed the large flag nailed to a tree. Twice they tried to climb the tree, only to be driven back by a fusillade—so, using an axe, they chopped down

the tree and then calmly proceeded to carry off the prize.

Also to be seen is General Eisenhower's SHAEF flag and the Flag of Bastogne, which was presented by the Belgians to the 101st Airborne Division in recognition of the defense of that city by "The Screaming Eagles" in December 1944.



This SHAEF flag was used at General Eisenhower's headquarters in World War II.

U. S. Army Photograph

The Museum has one Russian flag which in some respects symbolizes the conclusion of the war in Europe in 1945. It was acquired when American troops linked up with the Russians at Torgau. The flag belonged to the Russians' 34th Guard Corps. Painted on it is the medal that unit received from its own government for its part in the epic defense of Stalingrad.

Perhaps the most poignant, dramatic story of all is that of a tiny fragment—not even a complete flag but a shred of red cloth mounted on a plain white mat. It represents a combination of devotion and tragedy which assuredly entitles it to a special place among all of the historic colors whose background is so closely allied with success in battle. For this particular fragment is believed to be all that remains of the United States flag that flew over Corregidor until that island bastion was surrendered to the Japanese on 6 May 1942.



A periscopic telescope used by German forces at Verdun in World War I is among the unusual items on the Academy grounds. U. S. Army Photograph


Before turning over the fortress, orders went out to destroy all national colors on the island. By regulation this was accomplished by burning. However, Colonel Paul D. Bunker, West Point '03 and a former All-American football star, managed to secrete a small piece of the flag, vowing to himself that some day he would turn it over to the Secretary of War. He did not live to see the end of the war, however. When he grew desperately ill during his imprisonment at Karenko on Taiwan (Formosa) he tore the precious bit of cloth in half and passed one piece to a friend, Colonel Delbert Ausmus, hoping that one of them might get through.

Shortly afterward Colonel Bunker died and Colonel Ausmus, determined to carry out his friend's wish, sewed the flag fragment under a patch on the cuff of a cotton khaki shirt. Somehow he managed to retain possession of that shirt through countless inspections. Finally in November 1945, after being repatriated by victorious American troops, he headed for Washington to present the remaining shred of the Corregidor flag to then Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.

More recent acquisitions include a Republic of Korea national flag made by Pusan school girls and presented to the Academy by Major General Kim Chong Oh, Superintendent of the Korean Military Academy at Chinhai, Korea. In August 1953 the Museum received the colors of the historic 2d Infantry Regiment, second oldest regiment in the Regular Army, upon its deactivation. The Regiment dated back to 1791 when it was the Second Sub Legion of the United States Army under General "Mad Anthony" Wayne. The white and blue uniforms worn by the regiment's color bearers, and the Regimental Drum Major's baton which broke during the storming of the fortress of Chapultepec (to be repaired with wood from the fort's flag staff) also are on display.

Among the uniforms recalling days of the Indian Wars is a coat belonging to Chief Joseph, the Nez Perce leader who in 1877 decided to lead his band into Canada after the 4th Infantry Regiment was sent to round up the malcontents. The coat was worn by Chief Joseph when he surrendered to General (then Colonel) Nelson A. Miles at Bear Paw, Montana.

Very different is General John J. Pershing's field uniform which is on display together with his once secret Order of Battle Map. The olive drab uniform bears a single decoration,



the Distinguished Service Medal. The map shows the front line as of 11 November 1918 when the Armistice was signed to end World War I hostilities.

The ending of another war is memorialized in a display of the splendid buff sash that General Robert E. Lee wore when he kept his date with destiny on 9 April 1865 at Appomattox Court House. Almost in contrast is a drab blue field coat worn by General Ulysses S. Grant, together with the field glasses that Grant carried in the Battle of the Wilderness.

A uniform on display that links the earlier days of this century with World War II is the handsome dress uniform that General George S. Patton, Jr., West Point '09, wore as a cadet. His old Cadet Sergeant Major's chevrons also are displayed.

Nearby, the evolution of the Cadet uniform is depicted by a series of twenty-one statuettes made by the renowned sculptor Thomas Hudson Jones, showing in minute detail the uniforms worn since 1802. There are only four sets of these figures in existence. They were a gift to the Academy by The Quartermaster General on the occasion of the Academy's Sesquicentennial Anniversary observance in 1952. The famed Cadet gray uniform

This figurine depicts a Cadet corporal in the summer full dress uniform of the 1875 period. U. S. Army Photograph

dates back to the year 1816.

Young Cadets today—and of course all visitors—find much fascinating lore in the display of shoulder weapons that were used for drill and training purposes at the Academy. In the early days Cadets ranged from ten to thirty-four years of age, and the younger ones often were unable to handle the heavy French Charleville musket which was issued for drill. It is recorded that on 21 June 1802 an order was placed for six French musketoons, a smaller, lighter arm. One is on display.

By 1813 the entire Corps of Cadets had adopted a shortened artillery musket. Previously they had used a carbine-like weapon called "The Indian Musket," which had proved unsatisfactory from the standpoints of weight and caliber. In 1830 the Ordnance Department ordered three hundred special light weapons. Many other pieces were tried until 1894 when the standard Krag Jorgenson magazine rifle came into use. This was followed by the Springfield '03 until 1942 when the current Garand rifle was adopted.

These shoulder arms, old and new, are only a part of the painstakingly tended section that is devoted to arms of all sorts

Another statuette shows a 1952 regimental supply sergeant in chapel uniform.


U. S. Army Photograph



and descriptions. If the West Point Museum collection is not the largest in the world, it doubtless is among the most comprehensive. The complete evolution of military hand guns, rifles, automatic weapons and bayonets is traced by means of authentic pieces that go back to the Army's very earliest days. They represent every war in which the United States has participated. A large collection of swords also is shown.

Included in the collection is a rare Whitneyville Walker revolver, model of 1847, the first and heaviest revolver ever issued to any army in the world.

In the spacious Artillery Room, the complete evolution of the modern machine gun from the early volley guns, Gatling guns, Maxim and Browning and other types of machine guns, may be reviewed. There too are prototypes of infantry mortars, from the old Eighteenth Century models to the modern 4.2-inch weapon now in use by the Infantry. Here also one may trace the evolution of the grenade and artillery projectiles.



This flintlock swivel wall gun was once used to repel Indian attacks on frontier outposts.

U. S. Army Photograph

Artillery displays include actual weapons and models. Some of the larger pieces are on the Academy grounds. Models in the Artillery Room include those of Nineteenth Century coast defense guns, showing smooth-bore howitzers mounted on platforms that were raised to the firing position by human muscle. Others show the evolution of recoil mechanisms and of different stages of mobility. Additional interesting models are those of the old Billinghurst and Requa volley guns. (See "From Clubs and Spears to Automatic Weapons," June 1953 DIGEST.) In the Artillery Room is the French 75-mm. field piece with which American troops fired their first shot against the Germans in World War I.



The French 75-mm. gun with which American artillerymen fired their first shot in World War I was featured in a victory parade before presentation to the Academy.

National Archives Photograph

Among the unusual artillery items is a model of a Battery Forge and Limber, dating from about 1840. This complete blacksmith's establishment accompanied the horse artillery to make repairs to the guns—and of course to shoe the horses.

Besides the displays of shoulder arms used specifically by the Cadet Corps there is a large collection of small arms. A reminder of United States troop duty in China at the turn of the century is a collection of cumbersome wall rifles which the then backward Imperial Chinese Army used. Typical is the *Jingal*, an .80 caliber matchlock rifle that is six feet ten inches in length. It was served by a crew of three who, if well trained, could deliver as many as two shots a minute.

Pistols, revolvers and modern automatic firing hand guns are arranged in chronological order of their development. Among them are some items that have greater than usual historic value because of their connection with famed personages. The collection includes a pair of pistols that belonged to General George Washington; nearby is a Walther automatic pistol autographed by Heinrich Himmler, former head of Hitler's secret police; and in another case are the two ivory-handled revolvers that were General Patton's pride.

The Washington pistols are a recent acquisition, having been donated in 1953 by Clendenin J. Ryan. The rosewood stocks each

bear a silver plate with the etched inscription *Genl G. Washington*. The Walther automatic was formerly a prized possession of Nazi General Wolff, SS Commander in Italy and one of Himmler's key lieutenants. The Nazi eagle carrying a swastika is etched on one of the fancy ivory stocks while the SS insignia is on the other side. Himmler's autograph has been etched into the handle.

Besides his uniform and the pistols, General Patton provided the Museum with the eagle which hangs above the Museum entrance. Handsomely carved, it clutches a swastika in its talons. It was taken by Third Army troops from the German 107th Infantry Regiment at Idar-Oberstein, Germany, in March 1945.

Popular legend to the contrary, a glance at the famed Patton handguns shows that they are *not* a matching set. One is a Colt .45 he purchased in 1916; the other is a Smith and Wesson .357 Magnum Revolver obtained in 1935. Clearly visible on the grip of the Colt are two notches. Museum personnel relate the story behind these which dates back to May 1916, shortly after the General, then a young second lieutenant, had acquired the piece.

At that time Patton was serving as an aide to General Pershing on the punitive expedition into Mexico following depredations on the American border by the Mexican bandit chief, Francisco "Pancho" Villa. Lieutenant Patton was ordered to take seven enlisted men from the 16th Infantry Regiment, and one civilian interpreter, to visit a number of ranches to contract for the purchase of corn. In three automobiles they reached a village called Las Cienegas.

Learning that an uncle of Mexican General Julio Cardenas, head of the *Dorados*—Villa's personal bodyguard—lived in the town, Patton decided to investigate. After surrounding the house with his tiny command, Patton advanced. As he reached the front of the house three armed horsemen dashed out of the courtyard, saw him, wheeled and raced off. When they found their retreat cut off, however, they opened fire on Patton and the civilian interpreter. Patton fired back with his .45 and knocked one man off his horse, then fired again and killed one of the horses. As the dismounted bandit rose, Patton killed him with one shot. The third Mexican was killed by others as he attempted to flee on horseback.

The first man wounded by Patton meanwhile attempted to crawl off. When he was seen he fired and was in turn fired on

by the Americans. He collapsed and died from loss of blood. The fatal wound in his body proved to have come from Patton's first shot. He was quickly identified as none other than Cardenas. The three dead men were taken back to camp on the hoods of the cars. Arrived at American headquarters, the young lieutenant carried Cardenas' body to Pershing's tent, dumped it to the ground and saluted.


"Lieutenant Patton reporting, sir, with General Cardenas."

General Pershing promoted him to first lieutenant on the spot and Patton returned to his own tent to carve the two notches into the pistol that he carried into combat in both World Wars.

Along with the small arms is a comprehensive display of sword bayonets, pistol bayonets, standard rifle bayonets and a wide variety of foreign knives and sabers. There are Filipino bolos and a pearl handled *kris* which once belonged to a Sultan of Sulu in the Philippines.

Besides these cutting or stabbing weapons there is an ornate display of swords and scabbards. From the Pacific area following World War II came an abundance of famed Japanese samurai swords. Probably chief among these, from an historic-association value, is the sword that once belonged to Yamashita, "The Tiger of Malaya" who later commanded the Japanese in the Philippines. Most of the samurai swords were made by famed Japanese smiths, and most have long histories of their own. One was made by Fumiwara Kanenaga, who worked in a province north of Tokyo between 1650 and 1680.


Another of this type, a family heirloom dating back to 1506, once belonged to Japanese General Okamura. An even older one, a seven foot ceremonial sword, was made by Junitsuna in 1253.



This sword and scabbard were formerly carried by Japanese General Yamashita, "Tiger of Malaya."

U. S. Army Photograph

An exceptionally constructed dress sword is the one that General Charles deGaulle presented to General Eisenhower when the latter was embarking for the United States in June 1945. It dates to 1799 and was worn by Napoleon Bonaparte when he was First Consul.



Napoleon Bonaparte carried this dress sword while he was First Consul. The relic was presented to General Eisenhower in 1945 by the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

U. S. Army Photograph

Some of the swords are ornate and bejewelled. Others are plainer field issue type. There is one that belonged to Thaddeus Kosciusko, bearing its immortal inscription: "Draw me not without reason; sheathe me not without honor." It is particularly fitting that the sword of the great Polish hero and patriot should be at West Point for it was he who supervised a large part of the original engineering construction on the old fortifications there.

One sword connected with the early history of West Point is the regulation dress sword that belonged to Colonel Sylvanus Thayer, known as "The Father of West Point." (See "West Point Through the Years," March 1952 DIGEST.) Another interesting weapon is the service sword carried by a young captain named Andrew Summers Rowan, better known as the man who carried the "message to Garcia."

Not all of the items are articles of war. Unlike those which are priceless because of their historic significance, certain of the treasures do have a very definite intrinsic value. Chief among these is the ornate *Reichmarschall's* baton that once belonged to Hermann Goering. This super swagger stick weighs five pounds, has gold knobs at each end and is encrusted with six hundred and forty diamonds. In platinum lettering one may read Goering's name, rank and date of investiture. The base of the baton is carved ivory with twenty gold eagles and twenty platinum crosses mounted alternately in rows of five. Because

of the precious gems and metals it contains, it is valued at forty thousand dollars.

Less spectacular is Goering's guest book, bound in heavy solid silver. It was used at his hunting lodge, Karinhall, in Brandenburg, and contains the names of scores of leaders of many nationalities who visited the place. It was taken by the 101st Airborne Division when it captured the *Luftwaffe* headquarters.

Many of the items reflect Army life of early days. Heavy swinging frames display under glass the ornate, hand-lettered commissions that were issued a century ago. Typical is that which appointed one Robert MacFelley as a First Lieutenant of the 4th Infantry Regiment. Dated 3 February 1855, it bears the signature of President Franklin Pierce and is countersigned by the then Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, who later was to be President of the Confederacy.

A reminder of the fact that the Military Academy was originally founded as the country's only engineering school is the theodolite and sextant that belonged to the first graduate, Joseph Gardner Swift, Class of 1802, who later became Superintendent.

One display of special interest to all students of military history is a faded piece of ruled white paper. On it, still plainly legible despite the fact that it was written eighty-eight years ago, is the message:

*Benteen—Come on. Big Village. Be Quick. Bring Packs.
P.S. Bring pac.—W. W. Cooke*

This was the message from General George Armstrong Custer which was delivered to Captain F. W. Benteen, then on reconnaissance, on that tragic 25 June 1876 just before Custer led five companies of the 7th Cavalry into the historic massacre of the Little Big Horn.

Another memento of Custer, this time from a happier occasion, is the bugle which hangs in a place of honor in the Museum. The instrument belonged to Nathaniel Sisson, trumpeter of the 2d West Virginia Cavalry of Custer's brigade, who sounded upon it the notes of *Recall* that halted the last major Union attack of the Civil War when two Confederate officers appeared on the field under a flag of truce at Appomattox.

On the third floor are cabinets containing many-hued rows of decorations—mementoes of Army service in many corners of the world. Some are American decorations; some were given by grateful foreign governments. There is an old style Medal of

Honor awarded Brigadier General John P. Hatch, West Point 1845, for fearless leadership of his brigade in the fierce encounter at South Mountain, Maryland, in the Civil War. Another was issued to First Lieutenant George H. Morgan, 3d United States Cavalry, for gallantry in action against the Indians at Big Dry Fork, Arizona, 1882. There are the five grades of the flamboyant Belgian Order of Leopold; two honors from Czarist Russian days—the Order of Melusine and the Cross of St. Catherine. There is the Spanish War Cross; and the Badge of the Military Order of the Dragon, founded in Peking in 1900. The visitor might easily spend an entire day gathering stories of high adventure, drama and bravery behind each of the many medals and decorations in the cases.

One of the recent acquisitions is neither trophy nor relic but is treasured highly nonetheless. This is a bronze bust of President Eisenhower, a graduate of the Class of 1915, portraying him as a General of the Army. The work of the late Jo Davidson, prominent American sculptor, it was presented by George E. Sands of New York City who also arranged for the only other



This bronze bust of President Eisenhower by the late Jo Davidson is duplicated by one at the Royal Military Academy in England. U. S. Army Photograph

casting of the bust to be presented to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, England. Thus with the "sharing" of the bronze, the two academies have forged still another link in the friendly tie between their nations. This incidentally provides a significant commentary on the passage of time and events, since many of the relics stem from the era of the two wars with Britain.

New acquisitions are continually being received from all over the world. The Korean flags and other items mentioned are an illustration in point. Now being catalogued are several score Japanese orders and military medals from World War II. Each item is carefully studied and described and its history recorded. If it fits in with existing displays, it is integrated; or it may become the nucleus for an entirely new collection. Thus the Museum continues to grow in interest and importance.

All of these historic mementoes—and the many more that are to be seen—will reward him who makes the pleasant journey to the West Point Museum in the Hudson River valley. Whether soldier or civilian, historian or casual visitor, he will sense great drama latent in these lifeless exhibits. He will have a new and keener awareness of the part that the United States Army has played on the battlefield, in dust-swept frontier forts, in far-distant parts of the globe. He will come away with a greater respect for the men, living and dead, who helped forge the greatness of America by their dauntless courage and patriotic ideals. He will come away, too, with the feeling that the Museum is indeed a rare place where one may walk with history.

Oversea Recordings For Home Town Radios

Bernard Quinn

THE MAN with a microphone and a tape recorder has become an important member of the Public Information Officer's staff abroad. Through him, hundreds of thousands of American radio listeners are becoming familiar with a new type of Army radio program—the two- and four-minute tape recorded interviews with servicemen overseas.

Basically, the programs consist of one ingredient—a United States soldier in Germany, France or England, talking to relatives and to friends at home by means of a brief recorded interview. His remarks concerning oversea duty and personal well-being have a tremendous impact not only on those to whom they are directed primarily but on the community as well. They bridge the thousands of miles from Europe to the living room.

Such interviews are in great demand by the more than twelve hundred United States radio stations. The recordings are distributed through the Army Home Town News Center in Kansas City, Missouri. (See "From Front Lines to Headlines," September 1953 DIGEST.) During the month of August 1953, for example, the Center processed and mailed out some two hundred and fifty tapes, which brought back such typical remarks as "Send us more of this sort of material . . ." and ". . . can use all these Army interviews you send."

The stations receive the material free, subject only to two conditions—that the families of the servicemen be notified prior to broadcast time and that the tape be returned with the air time noted. An interview with a Seventh Army sergeant in Europe brought this typical response from a Buffalo, New York, station: "Used on *Armed Forces Mail Call* program. Notified

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family and invited them to station for interview. If you have more of these tape interviews for western New York area, please send them to us."

A great deal of the success with tape recordings depends upon the skill of the interviewer holding the microphone and asking the questions. Experience has shown that a well-rounded broadcast should include the full name, rank and complete home town address of the serviceman; a short description in his own words of the kind of duty, training, recreation or educational activities in which he is participating; and finally, a brief message to the folks at home.

Most interviews are about three minutes in length unless an extreme circumstance or unusual event is being described. Recordings are made on seven-inch reels of tape at a recording speed of seven and one-half inches per second, a speed which provides adequate broadcast quality and is suitable for playback on standard radio station equipment.



A Michigan soldier tells of his Army duties in a tape recorded interview at Heidelberg, Germany.

U. S. Army Photograph

In some cases the interview covers a wide range of topics, including living conditions, trips taken or planned, and similarities and differences between home and oversea life. In general, however, it has been found most practicable to stress the soldier's military duties, his accomplishments, promotions and new skills which he has acquired since leaving home.

Comment on activities at home is not encouraged. As a rule, home town listeners are interested mostly in what has happened to the serviceman since he left the community. To insure audience interest, the interviewee is not permitted to turn the broadcast into a long and involved letter home. Members of the audience beyond his immediate family, relatives and friends find such "spoken letters" dull listening.

The skilled interviewer plans a set of questions before making the recording. He tries to make them and their probable answers interesting but not too long. On the other hand, he seeks to avoid any question which can be answered with a simple "yes" or "no." Sometimes he finds it a good practice to rehearse the soldier to slow down the fast talker or eliminate rambling and inconclusive answers.

When making recordings of several servicemen from the same home town area, the interviewer strives for variety by getting them to answer different sets of questions. The last question is always followed by final identification of the individual.


Before the Home Town Radio Interview Project could begin in Europe, Public Information officers met in July 1952 to solve several technical problems. A special engineer section under Public Information Division, United States Army Europe, was established to maintain the recording equipment, dub tapes for Stateside use, and insure broadcast quality. Faced with a shortage of tape recorders, the PIO's were able to borrow additional equipment from the American Forces Network in Germany and the Mutual Security Agency in France.

The first year of operation has been a success. Over eight hundred recordings were received from eighteen units during the first six months. The 4th and 28th Divisions alone provided some three hundred interviews. By the end of the year more than twenty-one hundred personal interviews, messages and other recorded features had been collected and distributed through the Center in Kansas City. Some 85 percent of the material was broadcast over local radio stations. With increasing frequency, that familiar closing announcement, "This interview has come to you from Germany (or France or England)" strikes a vibrant chord with the families and friends of men and women in uniform in Europe.

Civil Defense— Adjunct to Military Power

Colonel Barnet W. Beers

CIVIL DEFENSE today is greatly complicated by scientific advances in the destructive power of weapons and the inhumanity of man in their employment. But no matter how complex the problems nor how intricate the solutions, its effectiveness remains dependent on firm leaders and co-operating citizens who will *get out and do* instead of just *ponder and fear*.



U. S. Army Photograph
COLONEL BEERS

Only in recent years has the concept of civil defense as an important adjunct to military power come into distinct focus. It is true that final victory is won by a nation's combat forces —its armies, navies and air armadas. However it is just as true that without the backing of a civilian populace with both the capability and will to support these agencies of military defense, victory in war would be unattainable.

Civil defense has been defined as "the organization of the people to minimize the effects of enemy action." Its function is that of protecting our civilian population as far as it is possible to do so in modern war, so that it may continue to furnish maximum support to the war effort.

To accomplish this, both active and passive defense measures must be taken—the former by military units manning defensive and striking forces, and the latter by a trained citizenry or-

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ganized to minimize, absorb and recover from sudden attack on our communities—to maintain order, fortitude and morale which are essential to production.

The essence of civil defense (in the form of personalized and common defense) has always existed; in a sense, it has created and made possible community life rather than being a by-product or consequence of it. However, as identified, defined and associated with war, civil defense had its beginning in World War I. An awareness of its importance was first induced in the United States by such episodes as the Black Tom explosion in New Jersey and the threat of Zeppelin raids on our large cities.

Unfortunately, the exultation of 11 November 1918 erased further thought of civil defense in the United States for the ensuing twenty-one years. But the invasion of Poland set off a chain reaction involving all of Europe; and our Nation, too, began to sense the inevitability of participation in another world conflict. Even then, civil defense did not spring into being with our military preparedness and training programs.

Recognizing a positive and vital need, the War Plans Division of the War Department in late 1939 and early 1940 undertook an exhaustive study of the subject and made urgent recommendations for the formulation of an organized civil defense structure. This proposal was rejected, or at least neglected, until June 1941—only six months before Pearl Harbor—when the significance of the Battle of Britain generated a widespread acceptance of the necessity for civil defense. But this acceptance was more passive or academic than active. The dramatic performance of the British citizenry inspired most Americans to agree, on an "if and when" basis, that should such an attack be inflicted on the United States, they would then certainly do their part in civil defense. But it took a disaster of Pearl Harbor magnitude to stimulate the volunteer response which enrolled some twelve million citizens and gave some semblance of organization and training to a fair proportion of them.

Contrasted with the eleventh-hour preparations in the United States, our adversary, Japan, had begun organizing as early as 1923. By 1928 that nation had in being a national civil defense organization. On a designated day each year, sirens would blow and bells would ring. Japanese citizens would take shelter while bundles of oil-soaked rags were ignited in the streets to simulate bombs. Organized neighborhood groups would then rush forth

and flail out the fires. Larger structures built specifically for test purposes would be set ablaze and fire fighting forces would extinguish them.

This civil defense-mindedness had far-reaching consequences in World War II. True, the effectiveness of Japanese civil defense was hampered by a paucity of material necessities, and Allied fire bomb raids on Tokyo, Osaka and Kobe overwhelmed the Japanese as certainly as did the atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet on the other hand, the lives of many school children in all the principal Japanese communities were saved by pre-planned and pre-executed evacuation programs. Even in atom-bombed Nagasaki, at least two hundred individuals are known to have survived by taking refuge in simple cave shelters as close as three hundred yards to ground zero at the time of the A-bomb explosion.

In Germany the pattern was somewhat different. The bold and poorly disguised development of German offensive air power led the Nazi military leaders to consider what might happen if the tables should be turned and the direction of planned strategic air attacks reversed. Thus Hermann Goering, the planner and leader of the *Luftwaffe*, became the German designer and promotor of civil defense in the early and middle thirties.

As for Great Britain, that nation was "under the gun" and extremely vulnerable to the formidable air force weapons the Nazis were developing. Yet it was at first difficult to convince the British people of the danger and vulnerability of their position. A few far-sighted leaders succeeded in pushing through legislation for the establishment of a national civil defense plan in 1935. Organization and training were carried out by the British Home Office. To these planners goes much of the credit for the successful defense in the Battle of Britain.

In the light of these experiences, what are the circumstances affecting civil defense in the United States today?

In the interim since World War II, science and technology have rendered the United States as physically vulnerable today as Great Britain was in 1935—maybe even more so. Barriers of time and space—our historic "defense in depth"—have been drastically trimmed by intercontinental bombers and fast moving ships. As a direct result of advances in the technology of war, civil defense has become as vital as the development and maintenance of military strength.

More than five years ago—some two years before the outbreak of the Korean War—a Congressional subcommittee made a study of Communist strategy and summed up the current aims of Soviet foreign policy in these words: "Soviet foreign policy, like their defense policy, begins with the assumption of inevitable war. It is the particular function of the Soviet Foreign Office in the grand strategy of the world revolution to play an intermediate role between that of the Red Army on the one hand and the Communist Parties on the other, in creating the conditions necessary for Communist victory . . . [In foreign policy] as in all other activities, they assume that the world revolution is the foundation of a morality both different and superior, in which the end *justifies all means*."

The physical power behind the Iron Curtain—its enormous war machine of armies, guns, tanks, bombers and other modern weapons which are merely tools to back up the Soviets' undying determination to achieve their own ends—is a serious threat to our continued existence as a free nation. So long as such strength exists, coupled with such well-known policies and ultimate aims, our own strength must be maintained—and civil defense is an important and integral element of that strength.

With science and technology annihilating time and space, the motivation for civil defense can no longer be just the *fact*, or even the *imminence* of war. The motivation must be, as in the case of Great Britain in 1935, the *possibility* of war. For the first time in our history, civil defense preparedness becomes an important adjunct to military strength in presenting a forceful deterrent to any aggressor.

Since the conclusion of World War II, the Defense Establishment has given full cognizance to the necessity for adequate civil defense in over-all planning. No other problem has been approached with more thoroughness over the years. From June 1945 until March 1949, the War Department and later the Department of Defense were the sole agencies of the Federal Government that had any designated responsibility for civil defense or its planning. Following a virtually continuous series of studies of other nations' experiences—and consultations with other Federal departments, the Council of State Governments, the Council of Mayors and the American Municipal Association—the Defense Department drew up basic plans for a practicable civil defense system. More important, it provided the leadership

for a co-ordinated development of fundamental doctrines of responsibility which fully recognize both the rights and the obligations of citizens, of local governments, of the states and of the Federal Government.

The Department of Defense also has recognized and consistently advocated that civil defense is clearly a civilian and civil government responsibility. In the past there may have been some misunderstanding concerning military leadership for such a program. In 1948, in its report on "Civil Defense for National Security," the Hopley Committee made several suggestions concerning Federal leadership. One was the organization of an agency whose head would report directly to the President, as now established in the Civil Defense Administration; another was the creation of a civilian agency with a civilian head reporting to the President through the Secretary of Defense. The report favored the latter arrangement as a means of giving quick and effective impetus to the program. But when this recommendation was not immediately approved, the Department gave its full support to the establishment by Congress of a separate Civil Defense Administration.

The Department of Defense has given this agency its full support. On various occasions, successive secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force, and chiefs of staffs, alike have stated: That a strong civil defense is an urgent and continuing necessity for this Nation.

That the build-up of civilian capabilities in this field is essential, not only from a humanitarian standpoint, but as a military necessity.

That the Armed Forces have supported and will continue to support the vital mission of civil defense.

That if war should come, the entire military effort will be concentrated upon the primary mission of defeating the enemy.

That a perfect and invulnerable defense is unattainable and that an enemy with the will to penetrate established defenses, can do so, in which case a competent, nationally organized civil defense must function to preserve or restore the production and communication facilities supporting the war-effort.

That there is a requirement for an organization planned, staffed, trained and in being, ready to function effectively at the time of any initial attack, and that if this is not the case, the military defense effort will be seriously weakened.

With the vast potentialities of modern weapons, civil defense leaders must guard against the danger of being overwhelmed by the intricacies and magnitude of the complex problems involved. Certainly, there is a wide gap between scientific possibility and operational probability. The planner can ascertain most of an enemy's capabilities, estimate the remainder and then do his utmost to guard against them all.

The problem of defense can be shared by appropriate assignment of missions and by teamwork through organization. Thus no individual at any level need be awed by the personal tasks he must assume as his share of the total job.

In the world of yesterday, civil defense was a poorly planned and second or third rate expediency of each nation's defense complex, associated solely with the adverse tide of combat. In today's world, however, civil defense is a thoroughly planned, well-designed and organic portion of virtually every nation's defense scheme. The member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization all have growing civil defense structures, varying in degrees of effectiveness and in achievement of established goals. The Soviet Union, of course, has never abandoned and has constantly improved its extensive version of civil defense as established during World War II.

The United States undeniably has made a good start toward a fundamentally well-designed civil defense program. Accelerating progress has been made since 1948. Prior to that, post-war United States had virtually no civil defense. Now, every one of our forty-eight states, all of our territories or possessions, and most of our cities, towns or counties, have civil defense directors with small but hard-core organizations that will grow and improve as time goes on.

No longer a haphazard expedient of war, civil defense is here to stay so long as the peace and freedom of nations is threatened. And as more and more citizens recognize its potentialities, so will it effectively add its great weight to our Nation's defensive team as a deterrent to war.

Centennial Of Japan's Awakening

Captain Max L. Marshall

THE ATMOSPHERE was thick with haze as Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry's squadron of four warships approached the shores of Japan—an empire that for more than two centuries had been isolated in self-imposed seclusion. The date was 8 April 1853. In the Commodore's possession were instructions from Washington—instructions he was thoroughly familiar with, as he himself had drawn them up. They gave him broad discretionary powers because, to succeed where others before him had failed—the English, the French, the Russians, the Spaniards, even his own countrymen—he would need diplomatic latitude as well as naval power, together with the elbow-room necessary to wield both. An intensive study of the record of all previous expeditions to open Japan had convinced him of that. This same study had also convinced him that in addition to displaying latent strength he must preserve "face", so vital in negotiations with Oriental people. Former expeditions had been wanting in one or both, and all had been unsuccessful.

After gleaning what was to be learned from previous failures by European powers, Perry turned his attention to a careful analysis of prior American-Japanese relations. The three most important encounters each contained a lesson. When pieced together, they clearly indicated those practices which he should avoid and those which he should adopt. A "force and face" approach would be the only one extending any promise of success; the record made that clear.

In 1837 an attempt had been made by an unarmed American merchantman to return a number of shipwrecked Japanese to their native land. No sooner did Japanese officials learn that this

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vessel entering Tokyo Bay was unarmed than they proceeded to treat the Americans with contempt, in the end firing on the ship and driving her away with the Japanese still aboard.

Nine years later, an official expedition under Commodore James Biddle not only resulted in failure but also in disastrous loss of face. As the Commodore led his small force into Tokyo Bay, he was immediately surrounded by hundreds of small guard boats. Before long, Japanese sailors were permitted to swarm aboard the ships and to become familiar with the men—a mistake costly in United States prestige since the commander's toleration was construed as a sign of weakness. Then, in a gesture of amity and courtesy (actually a loss of "face" in Oriental eyes) he agreed to board a Japanese junk and wait on a minor official who supposedly was bearing a letter from the Emperor.

Two insults followed in rapid succession. Instead of a communication from the Emperor, Biddle was handed a plain document bearing no signature or seal whatsoever. Then, on departing, he was manhandled by a Japanese enlisted man who "gave me a blow or push, which threw me back into the boat." Years later, when an American sailor undergoing mistreatment at the hands of the Japanese threatened his tormentors with reprisals by the United States Navy, he was laughed at and told about this incident in which a common enlisted man had gone unpunished after striking an American commodore.

Adding to the abuse, the message that Biddle sailed away with stated darkly, "The Emperor positively refuses the permission you desire. He earnestly advises you to depart immediately and to consult your own safety in not appearing again on our coast."

From these two experiences with the Japanese, Commodore Perry could learn what *not* to do. A third occasion, however, had positive worth in that it indicated what sort of conduct *was* effective in dealing with representatives of the Emperor.

In 1849, the American Squadron in the China Seas learned that fifteen American sailors were being held captive by the Japanese. Immediately, the USS *Preble* under Commander James Glynn was dispatched to demand their release. As the *Preble*, fully and menacingly armed, entered the harbor at Nagasaki, she was met with the usual swarm of Japanese guard boats. The Japanese ordered the *Preble* off, and when their commands were unheeded, they attempted to prevent her further advance. Glynn, however, brusquely pushed his way through and anchored.

His demand for the immediate return of the Americans was phrased in curt, unmistakable language. When the authorities attempted to put him off, he re-emphasized his demands and added that if the sailors were not soon returned, means would be found to force their release. Although Japanese batteries were all the while aimed at the *Preble*, and thousands of soldiers held in readiness on the shores, not a shot was fired. The officials' former attitude of contempt gave way to one of deprecation, and the captives were returned.

Shortly afterwards the United States decided on the Perry Expedition—a major effort to open Japan. There were many reasons for this decision, not the least of which was the cruel, inhuman treatment meted out to American sailors who from time to time fell into Japanese hands. Besides being confined and tortured, it is recorded that they were required to trample upon the crucifix on penalty of death if they refused. Sometimes they were thrown in cages in which they could not stand erect. And shipwrecks in the vicinity of Japan were not altogether infrequent, as the United States had entered into large-scale whaling in the North Pacific and wide-ranging vessels were frequently caught in violent storms.

In addition to negotiating a treaty to mitigate the handling of shipwrecked sailors, the United States also was interested in obtaining coaling stations to serve the new steam ships which were just beginning to replace the sailing vessels of the day. Also if it were possible by peaceful means to obtain a trade agreement, this too was looked upon as a desirable objective.

In his choice of commander for the expedition, President Millard Fillmore selected one of the highest ranking and most illustrious naval officers of the day. Brother to Oliver Hazard Perry of Lake Erie fame, Matthew Calbraith Perry had similarly performed long and distinguished service for his country. His Navy battle record reached all the way back to the War of 1812 and included such successes as the naval triumph at Vera Cruz during the Mexican War and diplomatic victories in Italy and elsewhere.

Thus, armed with a lifetime of service which had trained him well both in the employment of naval force and in the arts of diplomacy, and fully aware that his mission would require the use of both, the Commodore dropped anchor in Tokyo Bay.

The Japanese guard boats which attempted to surround the



The Japanese were fascinated by the miniature steam locomotive and other gifts representative of Western technology which Commodore Perry presented at Yokohama.

Courtesy U. S. Naval History Division

squadron were ignored. Decks of the American vessels were cleared for action and well-drilled crews manned battle stations. When Japanese sailors attempted to come aboard, their towlines were cast off. Those venturing to climb up the anchor chains were faced with a menacing assortment of pikes, cutlasses and pistols. They soon gave up. Then the guard boats began to mill around, apparently in wait.

Soon, a Japanese, representing himself as vice-governor of the adjacent territory, appeared alongside one of the American ships. Pointing to a scroll in his hand, he indicated that the gangway should be let down so that he could come aboard. He was bluntly refused permission and was informed that the Commodore would speak with none other than an official of rank corresponding with his own. The scroll carried by the Japanese was then opened and held so that it could be read by those on the ship. The message, in French, ordered the squadron to depart, adding that if the Americans remained they would do so at their own peril. This warning was rejected.

The official continued to be insistent about coming aboard. Finally convinced that he would not be received by Perry, he suggested that he be allowed to speak with an officer of rank comparable to his own. To this the Commodore consented, appointing a lieutenant to receive him.

Through his junior officer Perry made it known that he had come to deliver a letter to the Emperor from the President of the United States, and that he had come in peace. However, he made it clear that he would permit no indignity and that any aggressive action on the part of the Japanese would be dealt with promptly. Simultaneously, he demanded that the Japanese guard boats milling around the squadron be withdrawn immediately; otherwise they would be blown out of the water. In Perry's words: ". . . We shall be sorry, with our kind and friendly feelings to you, to do you any harm or to come into collision with you; but if you do not order your boats off, we shall fire into them and drive them off. Our boats are now armed and ready, and we cannot allow you more than fifteen minutes to give your orders and to keep them off. At the end of that time you must suffer." The Japanese complied and the guard boats were ordered away.

During the ensuing talks, the Commodore was told that it would be impossible to carry out any negotiations whatsoever

in Tokyo Bay, that the squadron must remove to Nagasaki—a port well fortified with coastal batteries. This Perry flatly refused to do, adding that if a person of appropriate rank were not soon on hand to receive the letter from the President, he would take ashore a landing party sufficient to deliver it personally to the Emperor.

Thus, in this first contact between Perry and Japanese officialdom, the tone was set which was to prevail during the many conferences that were to follow. When the Japanese subsequently sent higher ranking officials to negotiate, Navy officers of higher rank were nominated to meet them. Not until the appearance of specially appointed functionaries did the Commodore consent to take part personally. Throughout, he maintained a strong demeanor and was careful to permit no countenance-losing incident. With but one exception, he made no important concessions in return for those acceded to by the Japanese. The one proviso, however, was a major one. He agreed to return the next year to obtain the Emperor's answer to the President's letter requesting the opening of friendly relations between the two countries. This concession was made both in deference to the Japanese request for time to deliberate upon the proposal, and also of necessity, as the squadron was running short of water and supplies.

In the spring of 1854, just one hundred years ago, Perry returned to Tokyo Bay as he had promised, but in command of an even larger fleet. Negotiations were renewed after a Japanese bid for still more time was rejected. The hostility shown the Americans the previous year had disappeared and the difficult talks proceeded in an atmosphere of mutual respect, with exchanges of courtesies and entertainment.

As before the Commodore assiduously stuck to his guns—literally and figuratively—throughout the numerous parleys. The concessions which eventually rewarded his efforts were broad, surpassing all that had been hoped for in Washington, and culminated in the desired friendship pact on 31 March 1854.

The treaty itself marked a wide departure from Japanese law and custom built over a period of centuries. The main articles included provisions that shipwrecked American sailors would be treated humanely and would be repatriated, that supplies would be furnished American ships at specified ports, that an American consul would be received, and that the United States would

have the status of "most-favored nation" with respect to any future concessions that Japan might make to foreign powers. Thus, centuries of Japanese seclusion came to an end.

When news of the treaty reached America, the event was greeted with nation-wide acclaim which drowned out the divided attitudes which had prevailed when the expedition had been first proposed. From the very beginning, residents of California had been eager proponents of the mission. New England, too, had supported the venture because of its important whaling industry. Commercial interests had been eager for trade with Japan. Americans generally had been indignant over the treatment accorded shipwrecked sailors, and angry about the contempt shown the Christian religion. But still to many "Japan" was a vague word used to represent some strange, far-off land totally unimportant to them. Others considered that the expedition might well provoke a war.

However, with the successful and peaceful completion of the expedition, and with it the elevation of United States prestige in the eyes of the world, approval became universal.

Following the great celebrations which accompanied Perry's arrival in the United States as a hero, the old warrior settled down in New York as commander of the Brooklyn Navy Yard. For years his advice was sought by individuals and organizations concerned with Far East affairs. And it was in a speech before one such scholarly organization that the Commodore demonstrated his farsightedness in international affairs when he said:

"It requires no sage to predict events as strongly foreshadowed to us all; still westward will 'the course of empire take its way.' But the last act of the drama is yet to be unfolded; and notwithstanding the reasoning of political empirics, Westward, northward and southward, to me it seems that the people of America will, in some form or other, extend their dominion and their power, until they shall have brought within their mighty embrace multitudes of the islands of the great Pacific, and placed the Saxon race upon the eastern shores of Asia. And I think too, that eastward and southward will her great rival in future aggrandizement (Russia) stretch forth her power to the coasts of China and Siam; and thus the Saxon and the Cossack will meet once more, in strife or in friendship, on another field.

"Will it be in friendship? I fear not! The antagonistic exponents of freedom and absolutism must thus meet at last, and then will be fought that mighty battle on which the world will look with breathless interest; for on its issue will depend the freedom or the slavery of the world—despotism or rational liberty must be the fate of civilized man. I think I see in the distance the giants that are growing up for that fierce and final encounter; in the progress of events that battle must sooner or later inevitably be fought."

Efficiency and Economy For National Security

**From the Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense
Covering Activities During Fiscal Year 1953**

IT IS THE MISSION of the Armed Forces to defend the United States and support its policy. It is the duty of the Department of Defense to accomplish this mission effectively and efficiently within the resources made available by the American people through their Congress.

During the past year the Armed Forces of the United States successfully carried out their mission. In Korea our ground, sea and air forces continued to make the aggressor pay heavily for his unprovoked attack. Together with the forces of the Republic of Korea and units contributed by other United Nations members, they constantly exerted heavy pressure to compel the Communists to agree to reasonable armistice conditions. Their courage and determination stopped the Communist tide of aggression in Korea and brought about a cease-fire agreement.

The soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen who fought off the aggressor in a distant land have served their country well. We shall never know exactly what additional acts of aggression would have followed a quick Communist victory in Korea, but we do know that the sacrifices of these men gained the time required to rebuild America's military strength. We do know that Korea made us, as a Nation, clearly aware of the imminent threat of world Communism. We owe it to the memory of those who died in the service of their country and to all those who fought to halt the invader, to retain adequate military strength as long as this threat continues. If we falter in this undertaking, all past sacrifices have been in vain.

In other parts of the free world, the Armed Forces of the United States constituted a bulwark against Communist ex-

pansion and gave our allies increased confidence in the future. By their mere presence they gave proof of our determination to resist aggression. They assisted other freedom-loving people to strengthen their defenses. They, like their comrades in Korea, made a vital contribution to the security of their country.

On 30 June 1953, there were 3,555,000 men and women in uniform. The Army had, at the close of the fiscal year, a strength of 1,534,000 organized into 20 divisions, 18 regimental combat teams, 114 antiaircraft battalions, and necessary supporting elements such as tank, artillery, engineer and combat signal battalions. The Navy, with a strength of 794,000, was operating 407 warships and 16 carrier air groups with necessary supporting vessels and aircraft. The Marine Corps had its 249,000 men organized into three divisions and three air wings. The Air Force, with 978,000 in uniform, had activated 106 wings, ten of which were in only the first stages of organization.

In general, these units were well trained and ready for combat. Their equipment, while not all modern, was adequate. They formed the most powerful military force the United States had ever assembled short of war and constituted the major deterrent to further Communist aggression against the free world.

The 1953 Review of Military Programs. A period of transition is always a good time for taking stock. Earlier plans can be reviewed in the light of experience gained and adjusted in accordance with changing factors. Such a review is especially important when there is no precedent to chart the course to follow. Never before has the security of the United States demanded the maintenance in peacetime of Armed Forces of comparable size. Never before has our country faced the type of danger with which it now finds itself confronted nor has the security of the Nation been so closely tied to events in far-off corners of the world. The nature of the challenge requires frequent re-examination of policies and programs in order to make certain that we are on a true course.

Such a re-examination was started during the last six months of Fiscal Year 1953. It was based on two principles—first, we must provide Armed Forces of sufficient strength to deter future Communist aggression and, secondly, such forces must be maintained without undermining the economic health of the Nation. These two principles form a single objective. If we were to follow either one to the exclusion of the other, the future of our

country would be endangered. To have forces of insufficient strength would invite Communist aggression. To impose upon the Nation an excessive burden sapping the vitality of our economy would be self-defeating. The successful application of both principles simultaneously constitutes the major problem facing us at the present time.

The solution of this problem will not be an easy task. It will require patience and understanding on the part of the American people for there are no quick or easy answers. The cost of maintaining an adequate defense will probably be high for many years to come. Large numbers of our young men will have to serve in the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces themselves will have to practice the utmost economy and efficiency and at the same time attain highest possible combat readiness.

The goals for the size and composition of our Armed Forces in the years ahead will be determined by the National Security Council after the new Joint Chiefs of Staff complete their current review of the military factors in the world situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will consider all aspects of our military programs, including strategic plans, forces, missions, weapons and readiness levels. The progress made in this review by the end of the calendar year will be reflected in the budget request for Fiscal Year 1955.

In the meantime, interim measures had to be applied to the budget for Fiscal Year 1954. An analysis of future expenditures under the budget presented to the Congress in January 1953 indicated that the continuation of existing programs would almost surely endanger the economic health of the country and that drastic steps had to be taken quickly to reduce the prospective budgetary deficits without affecting national security.

As preliminary measures to a careful review of the 1954 budget, civilian personnel employment in the Department of Defense was frozen at the 31 January 1953 levels and in March a reduction of 40,000 was directed to be achieved by 31 May—a goal that was reached more than a month ahead of schedule. Similarly, the use of funds for all new or barely started construction projects was temporarily halted in February, pending verification of the real need for each project. A study of the organization of the Department of Defense also was undertaken.

The 1954 Budget. Analysis of the 1954 budget took place during February, March and April 1953 under auspices of the

National Security Council. It showed that any attempt to achieve a balanced Federal budget in Fiscal Year 1954 would involve greater reductions in the rate of buildup of our defenses than was prudent from the point of view of our national security. It did demonstrate, however, that important progress in reducing military expenditures could be made without endangering the national safety by establishing more realistic requirements, by better planning, and by more efficient utilization of manpower and other resources.

The areas for economy had to be chosen carefully. The actual combat strength of the Armed Forces was not to be curtailed but in fact increased. Appropriations and expenditures were to be reduced as much as possible, but without affecting the force goals that might be established as the result of the strategic review to be undertaken by the new Joint Chiefs of Staff. In other words, the revised 1954 budget had to be an interim budget, achieving increases in combat strength and substantial economies without prejudicing the future.

The budgetary review was based on the principle that maximum intelligent savings are essential if we are to be successful in maintaining adequate security forces in the years ahead. Cuts in military personnel without loss in combat strength were to be achieved by all the services by shifting officers and enlisted men from administrative and support units to combat units. Civilian jobs were surveyed so as to curtail administrative overhead and eliminate activities of marginal value to the Armed Forces. Procurement programs for such noncombat aircraft as transports, trainers and helicopters were reduced where it appeared that improved utilization of the large number of these types already on hand would meet military requirements. Reductions were ordered in the projected stockpiling of easy-to-get items which industry can produce promptly upon demand and of those items which as the result of lower consumption rates are now stocked in excess. Military construction projects not vital to national security were eliminated. In all areas a continuous review of current programs is being undertaken to spot additional opportunities for savings.

The review of the budget for Fiscal Year 1954 was completed in April and resulted in a reduction of about 7.5 billion dollars from the 41.3 billions requested by the previous administration. The budget of the Army was reduced by over 300 million

dollars, that of the Navy by 1.9 billion dollars, and that of the Air Force by 5.3 billions. Since the original budget, however, made only partial provision for combat operations in Korea and the cost of equipping additional Republic of Korea divisions, approximately 2.2 billions were added for these purposes—almost 2 billions of this amount for the Army, which carries the major responsibility for these requirements. Altogether, the revised April budget requested 36.0 billion dollars in new funds for the Department of Defense, a net reduction of 5.3 billions from the original January budget. Subsequent action by the Congress, after thorough and lengthy hearings, resulted in the appropriation of 34.5 billion dollars for Fiscal Year 1954.

These funds, together with unexpended balances of 62.3 billion dollars from prior years, provide the Department of Defense with 96.8 billions for expenditure during fiscal 1954 and subsequent years. Of this total, over 30 billions are allocated to the Army, almost 26 billions to the Navy, over 39 billions to the Air Force, and about 1 billion to inter-departmental activities. The procurement of aircraft and related materiel is provided for to the extent of 31.5 billion dollars—22.8 billions for the Air Force and 8.7 billions for the Navy. These funds are considered sufficient to continue the buildup of our defense pending the determination of future levels by the National Security Council.

The 1954 Force Levels. Under the interim force goals established for Fiscal Year 1954, the Army, while reducing its personnel from 1,534,000 to 1,423,000, was to maintain its organizational strength of 20 divisions and 18 regimental combat teams during Fiscal Year 1954 and increase the number of its antiaircraft battalions from 114 to 117. An additional reduction of 51,000 men, representing the personnel required for the Korean "pipeline" under current rotation policies, was planned pending clarification of the situation in Korea.

The Navy was to operate 408 warships and 16 carrier air groups and the Marine Corps three divisions and three aircraft wings, but with respective personnel reductions from 794,000 to 752,000 and from 249,000 to 230,000. An additional reduction of 5000 men for the Marine Corps is subject to future developments in Korea. The implementation of these programs will involve personnel reductions in the overhead and in the supporting units of all three services, but their over-all combat

effectiveness should be greater at the end of the fiscal year than at the beginning as the result of the shift of personnel from administrative to combat positions and of the increased deliveries of modern weapons and equipment during Fiscal Year 1954.

For the Air Force the major problem is the adjustment of its buildup schedule, which had been based on the assumption of an imminent date of maximum danger, to a dynamic, long-range undertaking capable of continued national support throughout the age of peril into which we have been thrown by the aggressive policy of world Communism. In the spring of 1953 the Air Force had activated 106 wings, but ten of these had received none of their assigned combat aircraft. In the revised budget, emphasis was placed on the achievement of maximum effective combat strength during Fiscal Year 1954, based on the simultaneous availability of modern aircraft, bases and trained personnel. Adjustments were made to facilitate transition to a long-range sustained program.

On this basis, the Air Force objective for 30 June 1954, was set at 114 fully equipped wings, and the objective for 30 June 1955, was tentatively established at 120 wings. No contracts for aircraft scheduled for combat wings were canceled. In fact, improved scheduling should make possible the recovery of some of the past slippages in production schedules. In support type aircraft, however, considerable provisional cuts were made which, without affecting the Air Force's combat capability, will make the program more adjustable to whatever new requirements are developed during the current year. The Air Force will have to reach its goal of 114 wings with an end-year strength of 960,000 men—a reduction of 18,000 compared to its strength at the close of Fiscal Year 1953.

These budgetary actions reflect no final decisions as to the future size and composition of our Armed Forces. They constitute necessary interim measures toward finding a solution to the problem of maintaining adequate defenses without undermining the Nation's economic health. Fiscal Year 1954 will be a year of continuous buildup in the combat strength of all the services. In view of the lack of concrete evidence indicating a change in Communist policy, this buildup is essential. It will provide a sound framework, unencumbered by excessive future commitments, on which to base whatever new long-range policies are considered necessary for our national security.

Organization

Increased military effectiveness cannot be obtained without adherence to time-tested principles of good management. Most important among these is the establishment of clear lines of authority and responsibility. This principle has been found essential in the operation of military units in the field as well as in the management of business enterprises regardless of size. Its application to the Department of Defense was made possible with the enactment of the President's Reorganization Plan No. 6 at the close of the fiscal year.

On the same day [30 June 1953] a reorganization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including the areas of responsibility of six new Assistant Secretaries, was approved by the Secretary. The Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, and the positions of Director of Installations and Director of the Defense Supply Management Agency were abolished, and their functions transferred to the Secretary of Defense.

Under the new organization, the Office of the Secretary of Defense will have a total of nine Assistant Secretaries. Three such positions were established in 1949 and are currently assigned to the Comptroller and to the fields of Manpower and Personnel and International Security Affairs; three of the six new positions will be used to replace the two statutory Boards dissolved by the reorganization; and the remaining three will make possible the elevation of three existing positions to the rank of Assistant Secretary. In addition, the Reorganization Plan established the General Counsel of the Department as a statutory official with the rank of an Assistant Secretary. Neither the Assistant Secretaries nor the General Counsel will be in the line of command. They will be staff advisers to the Secretary of Defense and carry out such additional duties as he may delegate to them. (See "Defense Department Reorganization," October 1953 DIGEST.)

Under the new organizational concept the Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to function as the strategic planners of the Department of Defense and as the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. To assist them in carrying out these all-important duties as effectively as possible and without undue distraction, three steps are being taken:

a. The provision of the 1948 Key West agreement, under which the Joint Chiefs of Staff designate one of their members as an executive agent for each unified command, is being revised to make the Secretaries of the military departments responsible for unified commands. This revision is in accordance with the principle that the line of command runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the military departments. The change will strengthen civilian responsibility within the Department, clarify lines of authority and focus the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon their primary responsibility for strategic planning and military advice.

b. Greater responsibility for organizing and directing the substructure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization is being placed upon the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Reorganization Plan has transferred the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with respect to managing the Joint Staff and the Director thereof, to the Chairman and has made the selection of the Director of the Joint Staff subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense, and that of the members of the Joint Staff subject to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These changes will free the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a group, of a large amount of administrative detail.

c. Greater emphasis is being placed on the introduction into military planning of the widest possible range of political and economic factors as well as the latest developments of modern science. With this objective in mind, the special skills of other parts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the knowledge of civilian experts will be drawn upon in the development of important staff studies by the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization.

The Reorganization Plan has made possible the introduction of sound management principles into the top-level organization of the Department of Defense. The lines of authority and responsibility have been clearly established.

Manpower and Personnel

The basic factor influencing all our manpower planning is the tremendous turnover in personnel experienced by the Armed Forces each year. Nearly a third of the men and women in uniform, or between 900,000 and 1,100,000 persons under current strength requirements, are being separated annually from the military services and must be replaced by an almost equal

number from civil life. The inevitable consequences of this fact are that most of our young men will have to serve for a number of years in the Armed Forces and, as reservists, remain ready for emergency duty for an even longer period thereafter. For the Armed Forces, this fact creates the tremendous task of maintaining effective combat units despite a constant flow of personnel in and out of service and while burdened with unusually large training establishments.

In order to maintain our Armed Forces as an effective deterrent to war, it will be essential that the American people learn to accept military service as a normal duty during the present period of international tension. It will be equally essential that the Armed Forces practice the utmost economy and efficiency in their utilization of the available manpower.

Efficient manpower utilization in the Armed Forces involves three major tasks: the elimination of unnecessary jobs, improvement in the utilization of available skills, and the maximum use of military and civilian personnel regardless of sex or race.

The elimination of less essential jobs in the Armed Forces is a continuing project under constant review by the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This task acquired additional urgency with the establishment of new military personnel ceilings for Fiscal Years 1953 and 1954. The objectives of the military departments have been to streamline combat units for greater effectiveness, to reduce the number and size of supporting units to a minimum, to make training establishments more adjustable to varying workloads, and to reduce the time spent by military personnel in transit. Success in these undertakings should make possible substantial economies in military personnel without reducing military strength.

Numerically, the rebuilding of the reserves, greatly depleted by recalls to active duty during the first two years of the Korean conflict, proceeded rapidly during Fiscal Year 1953. All veteran reservists who were on active duty involuntarily were returned to civil life, except for a few trained in critical specialties. The release in growing numbers of young reservists who have completed their tours of active duty is constantly adding potential strength to all reserve components. At the close of the year, the reserve forces of the United States, with a total strength of 2,095,000, were progressively developing the state of readiness urgently required by the present world situation.

Morale. The maintenance of a high state of morale is the responsibility of command at each echelon. The effectiveness with which this responsibility can be carried out, however, depends to a considerable degree on the assistance provided by the Congress as well as the American people.

In February 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed their concern about the difficulties that were being encountered in persuading capable officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers to consider military service as a worthwhile career. Complaints brought to their attention included such matters as restrictions on retirement benefits, inequities between the benefits provided to survivors of Regular and Reserve personnel, limitations on promotions of junior officers, reduction of weight allowances in shipping household goods, lack of dependent housing in oversea areas, and restrictions of commissary and exchange privileges and medical and dental care for dependents. Some of these complaints were of long standing, others of more recent origin, but their cumulative effect made them a particularly serious problem, urgently requiring remedial action.

Certain aspects of the morale problem have been under careful study for some time. A thorough analysis of the current systems of incentive, hazardous duty, and special pay was started in September 1952 by a five-man civilian commission, headed by Mr. Lewis L. Strauss. This group carefully reviewed current procedures and the criticisms leveled against them as well as the effect of possible changes in the morale of military personnel. Its report, completed in late March, was forwarded to the Armed Forces Committee of the Congress and is being used in the preparation of legislative proposals and new departmental regulations.

The problem of medical care for dependents of members of the Armed Forces, mentioned by the Strauss Commission as one of the factors affecting morale, was made the subject of a special study in April 1953 by a commission headed by Dr. Harold G. Moulton. Its report, issued on 30 June, concluded that the principle of medical care for dependents should be accepted as sound national policy and that it should be available, with proper safeguards against abuses and within prescribed limits as to types of illnesses and types of dependents, to service personnel wherever located, and on a uniform basis for all

branches of the Armed Forces. Legislation to carry out the recommendations of the Moulton Commission is being prepared.

The availability of housing and recreational facilities constitutes another major factor affecting the morale of the Armed Forces. In the United States the critical shortage of family housing for military personnel had been considerably alleviated at the beginning of the fiscal year. Nearly 70,000 units out of 83,500 programmed since the passage of the National Housing Act of 1949 had been completed or were under construction at the end of the fiscal year.

The United Services Organization, the American Red Cross, and many other volunteer groups continued to give invaluable assistance to the Armed Forces by providing camp shows, maintaining recreational facilities on and near military installations, and rendering many other indispensable services.

The chaplains of all the military services have devoted endless hours to minister to the needs of members of the Armed Forces. Whether working with men facing combat in Korea or young recruits thrown into a strange environment, their guidance and counsel helped countless servicemen. In the present ideological conflict with a godless society, their work transcends the spiritual welfare of service personnel; their mere presence serves as a constant reminder of the basic significance of the conflict that has been forced upon us.

Full awareness of the present ideological conflict is also reflected in the programs developed under the guidance of the Office of Armed Forces Information and Education. The primary mission of the military services is the training of effective combat forces. This training, however, cannot be limited to professional military indoctrination, but must, in order to be fully effective, give servicemen a clear understanding of the fundamental issues that are at stake at the present time. This is the purpose of the information programs of the Armed Forces. They aim to inculcate the highest ideals and sound practices of good citizenship and to develop a deep faith in the principles of our form of representative government. They are oriented to give servicemen a firm sense of mission, based on understanding the world tensions which have made their service necessary.

Health. During Fiscal Year 1953 the health of our Armed Forces continued to improve at an even greater rate than in previous years. The hospitalization rate was the lowest in twelve

years. The admission rate to medical treatment facilities was 377 per 1000 men as compared to 452 per 1000 for the previous year. Similarly, the rate of noneffectives decreased considerably, falling from 24.6 per 1000 troops in Fiscal Year 1952 to 19.9 in Fiscal Year 1953.

Civilian Personnel. On 30 June 1953, the Department of Defense employed 1,258,000 civilians in support of our Armed Forces at home and abroad. A continuing review of functions, job assignments, and workload led to a total reduction of 80,000 for the entire fiscal year. Further reductions are scheduled in the months to come.

Weapons, Equipment, and Facilities

Fiscal Year 1953 was a good production year. Major weapons, requiring a long lead time, were delivered in constantly increasing quantities. For example, the value of combat vehicles accepted by the Armed Forces was almost three times greater in Fiscal Year 1953 than in the previous year. In the shipbuilding program, the value of work put in place, *i.e.*, labor and materials, increased 47 percent. Deliveries of aircraft and engines during Fiscal Year 1953 more than equaled deliveries during the previous two years, and production of military aircraft was averaging over 900 per month during the last half of the fiscal year. In general, Fiscal Year 1953 brought a 35 percent increase over the previous year in the production of military supplies and the construction of facilities.

Mobilization Planning. A thorough review of existing plans and programs was initiated during the last half of Fiscal Year 1953 in order to determine the most effective means for the maintenance of an adequate mobilization base at minimum cost. This review will be a continuous task, taking into consideration the constantly changing requirements of the military services. Reappraisal of the mobilization base will center around more than seven hundred items of military supply that cover about 75 percent of the major production problems.

Experience has indicated that the major "bottleneck" in military production has been delay in the production of specialized machine tools and facilities. These items usually take longer to create than the weapons themselves. This problem is being met in part by storing Government-owned production equipment at or near the manufacturing plants after comple-

tion of defense orders. An even more rapid conversion to military production is being effected wherever possible by the establishment of dual-purpose plants, where military and civilian production facilities are arranged so that the labor force can be readily shifted to meet national security requirements.

Procurement. Studies were undertaken during the past year to determine whether the most efficient procurement is obtained by the three military departments purchasing separately, by a single department purchasing for all three, or by a joint procurement agency. Civilian experts analyzed the current procurement of paint, subsistence items, medical supplies, construction equipment, and tank-automotive equipment and made no major recommendations for changes. The development of simplified forms for purchases of less than 5000 dollars and the abandonment of formal advertising for purchases of 1000 dollars or less should facilitate and make these phases of the procurement process less costly. The Department's effort to insure that a fair share of military contracts is awarded to small business continued to receive special attention.

Supply Activities. Work on the joint cataloging, standardization and inspection programs of the Department was speeded up during the past year with the enactment of Public Law 436 on 1 July 1952, establishing the Defense Supply Management Agency. Emphasis was shifted from the identification of large numbers of unrelated items to the rapid completion of sections of the catalog dealing with specific groups of related items.

The standardization program was closely integrated during the past year with cataloging activities. Ideally, standardization should precede cataloging, but in view of the time required to develop standardized specifications it was decided to integrate the results of standardization in later editions of the catalog rather than postpone its publication for an indefinite period.

The savings that will be made as the result of the standardization program are impossible to estimate accurately, but such examples as the reduction in the number of approved electron tubes to be incorporated in new designs from 5000 to 192, the reduction in the types of audio amplifiers from 300 to 2, and in the types of clothing and individual equipment from 5984 to 4511 indicate that these savings should be substantial.

With the enactment of Reorganization Plan No. 6, the Defense Supply Management Agency was dissolved and the responsibility

for the Agency's activities was assigned directly to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics). This direct assignment reflects the importance the Department attaches to the orderly and timely development of effective cataloging, standardization, and inspection programs and their progressive utilization in all military supply functions.

Properties and Installations. The great importance of good management in this field is illustrated by the fact that the military departments own approximately twenty-six million acres within the United States, its territories, and possessions. The dollar cost of this land and improvements is estimated to be nearly 17 billion dollars. In addition, over three million acres are under lease to the military departments from private and public sources. This property is one of the principal capital assets of the Department of Defense. The need for effective surveillance of public works programs was formally recognized with the enactment of Public Law 534 on 14 July 1952, establishing the office of Director of Installations, and was further emphasized by Reorganization Plan No. 6, which replaced this statutory office at the close of the fiscal year with an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Properties and Installations).

As a first step in the reappraisal of public works program, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force were asked on 4 February 1953, to halt work on all construction less than 20 percent completed that could not be certified as essential to meet the assigned missions of the military services and as adhering to strict standard of economy. No new construction project was to be started unless it had met the same standards. This review resulted in the cancellation of numerous projects and reductions in the scope of many others.

Mutual Security

A strong instrument for the establishment of greater security in the free world has been the United States program for military assistance. At the beginning of Fiscal Year 1953 the value of weapons and equipment shipped to foreign countries since the program was initiated in the spring of 1950 amounted to only 2.5 billion dollars. During the past year such shipments totaled 3.8 billion dollars, or more than one and a half times as much as during the three preceding fiscal years combined. This considerable increase in deliveries reflects the higher rate

of military production achieved by American industry. Even after the high priority requirements of the Korean conflict were met, substantial quantities of weapons and equipment remained available for other areas.

During the past four years 7.8 million measurement tons of materiel have been shipped under the Mutual Defense Assistance Programs, exclusive of aircraft and vessels delivered under their own power. These shipments included nearly 27,400 tanks and combat vehicles, 25,800 artillery pieces, 1,500,000 small arms and machine guns, 147,000 motor transport vehicles, 546 naval vessels and 4340 aircraft. Of this total, deliveries during Fiscal Year 1953 amounted to more than four million measurement tons and about 15,400 tanks and combat vehicles, 12,200 artillery pieces, 400,000 small arms and machine guns, 88,000 motor transport vehicles, 169 naval vessels and 2161 aircraft.

Additional military security for friendly nations is provided by the reimbursable aid program under which approved requests for weapons and equipment are merged with the procurement programs of the military departments and paid for in full by the recipient country upon order of delivery. On 30 June 1953, financial arrangements had been concluded with 45 foreign countries involving the purchase of 668 million dollars' worth of equipment, materials and services; deliveries had been made to 43 countries to the amount of 253 million dollars. An expansion of this program should do much to strengthen ties among the free nations. (See "Military Assistance on a Reimbursable Basis," November 1953 DIGEST.)

Much of the effectiveness of our military assistance would be lost unless provisions were made for the training of foreign nationals in the use and maintenance of United States equipment. This phase of the program continued to be emphasized during the past year. On 30 June 1953, more than 32,500 foreign nationals had completed their courses or were in training at Army, Navy and Air Force installations in this country and abroad. In addition, 232 mobile training teams had been formed and 295 civilian technicians engaged to train foreign nationals in the use of newly designed or complicated equipment. According to all reports received, the training program constitutes one of the most profitable phases of the entire Mutual Defense Assistance Program, repaying many times its cost of about 1.5 percent of the total funds appropriated for mutual defense.

Conclusion

As long as the threat of aggression continues, we must keep our country strong. Any other course would invite disaster.

The type of military strength that we must continue to develop is one that is both effective in deterring further aggression and capable of being sustained over a prolonged period. It must neither undermine the standards or the ideals by which we live nor endanger the strength of our economic system. Such military strength cannot be measured in numbers of men, weapons and facilities alone. It is influenced by the intentions and capabilities of potential aggressors as well as by the resolution of our allies. Its composition is subject to constant change resulting from technological developments, and these developments often make the ability to produce the newest weapons more important than the accumulation of large reserves. It does not exist for its own sake, but to protect our way of life. It must rest on the economic health of the Nation and the determination and unity of the American people. Its effectiveness at all times is determined to a large extent by leadership, morale and the general efficiency of operations in the military services. In these changing times only the frequent reappraisal of all these factors can continue to give us the military establishment required for the security of our country.

Such a reappraisal is well under way. Its objective is clear-cut—the military and financial adjustment of our defense programs for the long pull. To reach this objective, effectiveness with economy must be made the watchwords of our defense effort. To maintain an adequate national defense for the indefinite future, we have found it necessary to devote a larger share of our national resources for this purpose than any of us had heretofore anticipated. To protect our economy, maximum effectiveness at minimum cost is essential. In addition, we must develop the best possible military plans. These plans must be sound guides to action in case of war. They must incorporate the most competent and considered thinking from every point of view—military, scientific, industrial and economic.

The first steps in the adjustment of our military programs for the long pull were taken in the spring of 1953 with the review of the budget for Fiscal Year 1954. Instead of continuing to work with schedules for a maximum buildup by an arbitrary date, it was recognized that as a nation we had achieved a state

of readiness enabling us to plan for an orderly increase in military strength which can be maintained into the indefinite future at a level that is adequate but not excessive at all times. We can now properly and safely adjust our defense plans in the light of new military and international developments. With this policy in effect, our Armed Forces can be kept equipped with the latest weapons in the years to come without imposing a crushing economic burden upon the American people. At the same time, we shall avoid the waste inherent in a succession of feast and famine budgets and in the overproduction of weapons and equipment which become obsolete even before delivery.

Recommendations on the next steps to be taken will be reflected by the budget request for Fiscal Year 1955 to be submitted to the second session of the 83d Congress.

The review of our military programs and the development of greater efficiency constitute the two major problems confronting the Department of Defense at the present time. Their resolution not only will provide the type of military establishment required for our security but also will assure the American people that each defense dollar is buying a full dollar's worth of security. Every possible effort is being devoted to reaching these objectives. In view of the immense size of our defense operations at present, involving annual expenditures of over 40 billion dollars including a payroll for three and a half million men and women in uniform and one and a quarter million civilians, the results of these efforts will directly or indirectly affect every citizen.

The programs to be submitted to the Congress are based on the most careful consideration of all alternatives, realizing that we must have the best possible military plans and implement them with effectiveness and economy. The improvements inherent in our new plans are evolutionary in nature and will protect both the security and the economy of the country. The importance of these programs to the future of the Nation is so great that they deserve the most careful review and fullest co-operation in their implementation by all branches of the Government. In fact, they deserve the fullest support of all citizens.

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